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ABSTRACT 
The current interest in developing small and micro enterprise 
financing projects is reminiscent of earlier attempts to finance 
special small farmer credit projects. This paper reviews the 
generally negative experience of those efforts and identifies 
areas of policy change and innovation that emerges from that 
review which can guide the design of micro enterprise projects. 
The experience of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is also reviewed 
as one of the most interesting innovations in providing small 
loans to the rural poor. 
FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR SMALL AND 
MICRO ENTERPRISES: A NEED FOR POLICY CHANGES AND INNOVATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The great concern that exists today for providing financial 
services to small and micro enterprises is reminiscent of the 
flurry of activity in the 1960s and early 1970s to finance small 
farmer credit programs. The approaches, the rationale, the 
political concerns, the proposed earmarking and targeting of 
funds are similar to that earlier period. The generally negative 
evaluation of that small farmer experience, especially in terms 
of the failure to build strong, viable, self-sustaining financial 
institutions to serve small farmers, suggests a need for caution 
in the current enthusiasm for developing special programs to 
finance nonfarm enterprises. It is important to analyze the 
small farm experience with a view towards identifying those 
factors that may determine success or failure for small and micro 
enterprise financing projects. 
There are two purposes for this article. The first is to 
briefly review the small farmer experience, and the second is to 
identify areas of policy change and innovation that eme~ge from 
that review which can guide the design of project and programs 
for small and micro enterprises. Since the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh is one of the most interesting innovations in recent 
times (and which gets a large, perhaps excessive, amount of 
publicity), an attempt is made to also identify lessons learned 
from its experience. 
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No distinction is made in this paper between small and micro 
enterprises. Although there are differences which may be impor-
tant for some purposes, what is of concern from the financial 
perspective is that the clients are small operators, mostly 
individual proprietors, operating out of their homes and/or 
workshops, producing and/or marketing products using fairly 
simple technology, with no or only simple business accounts, 
self-financing most of their investment and working capital, 
employing few workers, and facing considerable risk in the supply 
and price of inputs, and in the price of outputs. Most have had 
no experience with formal financial intermediaries, or at most 
they use only checking and savings services. Most are not very 
attractive customers to the commercial banking sector compared to 
larger, more sophisticated clients who maintain more extensive 
written accounts and have established banking and credit relatio-
nships. Many of these enterprises are located in rural areas or 
small towns where financial services are not readily available 
for either farm or nonfarm clients. Many are linked through 
backward or forward linkages to the agricultural sector, so their 
success depends greatly on agricultural performance. 
THE FINANCIAL SERVICES PROBLEM 
The financial "problem" with respect to small nonfarm 
enterprises, as perceived by policy makers, appears to be similar 
to past perceptions of the small farmer credit problem. The 
enterprises are perceived as being small, backward, unproductive, 
and a drag on economic growth for several reasons, but an 
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inadequate supply of low interest, long term credit is identified 
as a major problem that policymakers think they can do something 
about in the short run. Short term working capital may also be 
perceived as a problem but it is expected that entrepreneurs can 
more easily obtain credit for such capital. Existing financial 
intermediaries are perceived as being conservative, risk averse 
and uninnovative with respect to small enterprise lending, and 
prefer instead to concentrate their loan portfolio on larger 
enterprises or financing large scale commerce and trade. The 
"need" of the small enterprises is identified as loans and no 
consideration is given to the value of banks providing a supply 
of safe, dependable deposit and savings services. If these 
enterprises borrow, it is usually short term and emergency loans 
from informal sources that are perceived as charging usurious 
interest rates. 
THE RESPONSE OF POLICY MAKERS 
Faced with this perception of the problem, policy makers 
have introduced several measures to finance small farmers, and 
many of these are now being introduced in small and micro 
enterprise projects. 
1. Increase the supply of funds available for lending to the 
priority sector (small farmers or enterprises) through: 
a. portfolio quotas or targets for existing lenders, 
b. the creation of specialized financial institutions to 
work only with the priority sector(s), 
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c. lending by non-financial institutions (ministries, 
departments, institutes), and 
d. rediscount programs through the central bank, often 
funded by donors. 
2. Reduce the interest rate of loans to the priority sector 
through: 
a. interest rate ceilings which set the lowest rates for 
the smallest/poorest borrowers, 
b. low interest rates charged on refinance funds provided 
by the Central Bank, 
c. encouragement to banks to cross-subsidize by charging 
higher rates to non-priority borrowers in compensation 
for low rates to priority borrowers, 
d. mandatory placement of private and/or public deposits 
in specialized lending institutions, and 
e. direct government interest subsidies to lenders. 
3. Reduce lending risks and costs through: 
a. targeting loans for purposes assumed to be profitable 
and/or priority, 
b. crop and loan guarantees, 
c. creation of joint liability through lending to groups 
of borrowers, 
d. technical assistance to lenders to help improve 
institutional efficiency, and 
e. establishing lines-of-credit for preferred borrowers. 
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4. Nationalization of banks that fail to meet social objec-
tives. 
PROBLEMS OF PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS 
In some cases the measures taken by policy makers have 
succeeded in temporarily expanding lending to the priority 
sector. Some institutions have gained experience in lending to a 
new clientele and some have introduced innovations to more 
effectively serve customers. The failures are more numerous, 
however. They have been extensively documented elsewhere and 
will only be summarized here.1 
1. Quotas and targets have been ignored or evaded by means such 
as creative loan documentation and multiple small loans to 
large borrowers. 
2. Lenders accept the alternative to lending such as buying low 
interest government securities. 
3. Interest rate controls result in implicit price rationing of 
loans which leads to high borrower transaction costs and a 
concentration of loans among wealthier borrowers. 
4. A diversion of cheap loans from intended purposes into 
higher return activities, and the substitution of borrowed 
for own capital. 
5. Political intervention to direct "cheap" loans to particular 
clients and to protect delinquent borrowers. 
6. High lender transaction costs due to heavy reporting 
requirements. 
7. High loan delinquency and default. 
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s. Weakening of institutions because of high lending costs, low 
loan recovery and a failure to mobilize deposits. 
9. Institutions are unreliable from the borrower perspective 
because their liquidity and survival depend on the whims of 
government or donor funding. 
In short, viable, self-sustaining institutions have not been 
developed, a few fortunate borrowers may have enjoyed a one-shot 
increase in liquidity, close lender-borrower relations have not 
been built, and the difficult problems faced by priority bor-
rowers have not been reduced so that they can become more 
attractive customers to financial institutions. If innovations 
have occurred they have often been designed to avoid rather than 
implement the intent of the decisionmakers.2 The lenders have 
not developed the interest nor expertise needed to continue to 
effectively serve the priority sector{s). 
THE GRAMEEN BANK EXPERIENCE 
The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is one of the most publicized 
programs today designed to meet the financial needs of low income 
people. Its relative success in the midst of so many failures 
makes it worthy of special comment. The comments presented are 
derived from observing its evolution during the past ten years 
and reviewing in-depth studies of its operations.3 Although it 
contains many innovative features, it must be recognized that 
there are similar programs in Bangladesh (especially the Swanir-
vor program) and elsewhere, but they don't have the same recog-
nized success as does the Grameen Bank.4 
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The activities which eventually evolved into the present day 
Grameen Bank began with the efforts of the founder, Professor 
Muhammed Yunus of the Department of Economics, Chittagong 
University, to obtain credit for the landless without collateral 
in an area near his university5. That initiative evolved from a 
program to assist borrowers to obtain credit from cooperating 
banks to an independent bank, partly owned by its low income 
clients. 
The essential characteristics of the Grameen Bank are the 
following: 
1. A bank branch with a Field Manager (FM) and several bank 
workers (BW) covers an area including 15 to 22 villages. 
2. Persons with families owning less than 0.5 acres of land or 
assets valued at less than one acre of land are eligible for 
a loan. 
3. The FMs and BWs travel among the villages organizing groups 
of five members who are like-minded and have similar social-
economic backgrounds. Each group elects its own chairman 
and secretary and holds weekly meetings. Males and females 
belong to different groups. 
4. After a month-long training period, the two most needy 
members are invited to submit loan proposals. The proposals 
are discussed in group meetings, reviewed by the BW, and 
eventually submitted for approval by the FM and zonal 
office. 
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5. Loans are collateral-free and repayments are usually 
collected weekly at the rate of 2 percent of the principal. 
If the first two borrowers use the proceeds as requested, 
make payments when due, and observe rules and regulations, 
the next two members will be invited to apply. If not, the 
remaining members automatically are disqualified. If one of 
the five willfully defaults, no new loans are made until all 
arrears are cleared. 
6. Group members save one taka6 per week plus five percent of 
the loan amount which is set aside at the time of disburse-
ment. This Group Fund can be borrowed from in time of need 
at terms set by the group. An Emergency Fund is also 
created with payments of 25 percent of the interest due 
after the loan is fully repaid. It can be used to repay the 
loan of a member who is unable to repay due to accident or 
other unforeseen reasons. 
7. The interest rate on loans is 16 percent, the going rate for 
rural areas, but the effective interest rate for the 
borrower is well over 20 percent because of the forced 
savings in the Group Fund and the Emergency Fund. 
8. A male BW serves about 250 members while a female BW serves 
150 members. They visit the groups weekly to collect 
savings and loan payments, and disburse loans. As of April 
1986, about two-thirds of the members were women and they 
received about 55 percent of the loans disbursed. 
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9. The Grameen Bank does not target loans. It basically 
finances non-crop agricultural and non-farm activities. 
Loans have been extended for over three hundred different 
activities. Initially, trading and shopkeeping represented 
the largest sector financed. As the share of female members 
rose, livestock and fishing sector loans expanded. Beginn-
ing in 1982, collective or joint enterprise loans were 
extended and these represented five percent of the amount of 
loans disbursed in 1985. 
10. As of April 1986, the Grameen Bank had grown to over 200 
branches, covering more than 4,000 villages with almost 
200,000 members and over 1.1 billion taka in total loans 
disbursed. At that same date, over 99 percent of the loans 
had been recovered within one year of disbursement and over 
99 percent within two years of disbursement. 
Two issues are often debated about the Grameen Bank. One 
concerns the importance of Professor Yunus in explaining its 
success and the ability of the organization to maintain high 
performance in its rapid expansion. The other concerns the 
extent to which it grants subsidized credit. On this second 
issue, there is some information. First, in one sense of the 
term, it does not engage in subsidized lending because it charges 
the same interest rate as do the nationalized commercial banks 
for rural loans, plus the implicit interest involved in the 
forced savings funds. Thus, the effective annual interest rate 
to the borrower is well over 20 percent. On the other hand, in 
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1985 its loan funds cost only 5.8 percent. An important reason 
was the relatively low 2.9 percent cost of funds from foreign 
institutions (largely IFAD), which represented almost 40 percent 
of total loan funds, compared to about 8 percent charged for 
funds received from the Central Bank. If it would have paid the 
8.5 percent rate charged by the Central Bank to other lenders, 
its' cost of funds would have represented 22.9 percent of loans 
and deposits. On the revenue side, it has maintained about half 
of its funds in fixed and term deposits which represent low risk 
and operating costs, but earned an average rate of 12.5 percent 
interest in 1985. Thus the approximate 7 percent spread on 
financial operations helped compensate for the cost of lending 
operations. Whether or not this implicit subsidy is justified to 
cover start-up costs is an issue beyond the scope of this paper. 
The magnitude of the subsidy, however, implies it is too great to 
be sustained if the program was to be extended to the millions of 
rural poor in the country. 
NEED FOR POLICY CHANGES AND INNOVATION 
The negative experiences of many farm credit projects as 
well as many small scale and micro enterprise projects suggest a 
need for major changes in the way that finance is viewed and 
handled in development projects. The fairly positive results 
enjoyed by the Grameen Bank, as well as some other projects, 
suggest areas for policy changes and future innovation: 
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1. Interest rate policy. Interest rates need to be high enough 
to cover lender costs, default risks and inflation. Only in 
this way can lending institutions/programs become viable and 
self-sufficient. Subsidies imply continual handouts from 
government and donors, on the one hand, going to a small 
group of privileged beneficiaries, on the other hand. 
Interest rate policies must also be flexible enough to 
adjust to changes in cost of funds and inflation. 
2. Targeting of loan funds. Loans are most valuable when they 
meet borrower needs; they are least valuable when borrowers 
are forced to use them for specific purposes. Borrowers are 
more likely to repay when they perceive the opportunity of 
getting a new loan.7 Therefore, a whole household or firm 
approach, rather than an enterprise approach, is necessary 
for developing client-borrower relationships. Borrowers 
need the opportunity to borrow for their perceived needs. 
Because of fungibility of funds, loans will not flow into 
targeted purposes anyway if they are not perceived as 
profitable or useful. 
3. Group lending. Lending to groups offers possibilities to 
reduce lender costs and improve loan recovery. In practice, 
however, attempts at group lending have often failed to 
discover the appropriate group dynamics that will actually 
produce the expected benefits. The solidarity group 
approach in the FEDECCREDITO project in El Salvador. the 
groups formed within the CIDES cooperative in Columbia8, the 
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solidarity group component of the PRODEME project in the 
Dominican Republic9 , and the Grameen Bank groups appear to 
be most successful. Successful groups appear to be small, 
homogeneous, and self-select their members. 
4. Loan payback. Loan repayment must be based on frequent loan 
installments, frequently weekly or daily. Establishing the 
habit of paying installments on a timely basis and even 
requiring repayment faster than easily generated by the cash 
flow of the project funded is important in establishing 
responsible borrowing. 
5. Using financial institutions. Providing credit through non-
bank rather than banking institutions usually increases 
opportunities for political patronage and results in sloppy 
lending practices, poor bookkeeping and ineffective or 
nonexistent loan recovery activities. Assisting entreprene-
urs to obtain credit from regular banking sources helps them 
to become acquainted with bank procedures, gives them access 
to deposit and other banking sources, and helps familiarize 
the banks with the operations of potential new customers. 
6. Developing close bank-client relations. The objective of a 
small enterprise project should be to assist entrepreneurs 
to become long-term customers of a financial institution(s). 
This should also be the objective of the financial institu-
tion. Therefore, both entrepreneur and banker should work 
towards developing closer bank-client relations which can 
lead to simplified banking procedures and lower transaction 
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costs for both. Inventory norms may provide some guidelines 
in setting lending limits until information about individual 
customers can be obtained (Liedholm}. 
7. Savings mobilization. Financial institutions should strive 
to become financially independent by mobilizing a large 
share of their loanable funds. This will make them more 
immune from government pressures, improve discipline in 
financial operations, improve loan recovery and provide 
important deposit and savings services to customers.10 
Examples of projects where borrowers have been forced to 
make deposits include Grameen Bank, BKK in Indonesia, and 
the ADEMI project in the Dominican Republic. Voluntary 
savings deposits, however, would seem to be necessary if 
institutions are to mobilize sufficient deposits to achieve 
self-sufficiency. Interestingly, the Grameen Bank has begun 
to accept deposits from persons who do not qualify as 
members of its target group. 
a. Increase the spread of banking outlets. An expansion in 
banking outlets is the single most important factor affect-
ing bank depositsll. It also contributes to rapid credit 
delivery, increased credit turnover, and lower administra-
tion costs due to economies of scale. Furthermore, by 
reducing costs, decentralizing branches, and improving 
credit evaluation, financial institutions can more easily 
afford to service small loans and deposit accounts needed by 
low income customers. Since formal bank branches are 
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expensive to operate, some innovations are being explored, 
such as mobile branches which travel to towns and villages 
on market days, and partial service branches. 
9. Market linkages and the informal sector. Greater use needs 
to be made of nonbank institutions as a source of credit 
services. Subcontracting with larger firms can provide both 
credit and a secure market for output (Mead). Informal 
financial organizations such as ROSCAs are widely found in 
developing countries and may be linked to formal financial 
groups. Efforts are underway in Asia to develop more links 
between self-help groups and financial institutions to 
provide a place for such groups to bank their savings as 
well as increase their access to loans (Quinones). Credit 
unions represent an organizational form between small 
informal groups and formal banks that are being effectively 
formed in many countries. All these alternatives represent 
examples of ways to transfer high transaction costs from 
financial institutions that don't want to or can't bear them 
to institutions and/or customers that are willing to bear 
them. 
10. Risk reduction. Loan guarantees are frequently thought of 
as the best way to reduce risks to lenders. They frequently 
don't work well in practice, however, and often times simply 
represent subsidies hidden under another name. More 
effective ways to reduce risks are likely to develop if a) 
lenders are permitted to diversify their loans in a par-
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ticular location rather than target them on a particular 
enterprise or sector, and if b) they are encouraged to 
distribute their risk across locations and/or markets 
through branching, secondary markets for loans, and li-
quidity funds. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Small farmer credit programs have generally been unsuccess-
ful in meeting the needs of creating viable, self-sufficient 
financial institutions. In some cases they have simply provided 
a one-shot increase in liquidity for the borrowers lucky enough 
to get the loans. Far too frequently, the distribution of loans 
has been concentrated among richer farmers, transaction costs 
have been high for both lender and borrower, and loan recovery 
rates are low. Many of these same problems exist for projects 
targeting small nonfarm enterprises. The exceptional cases, 
including the Grameen Bank, are worthy of analysis because of the 
insights that they provide about the innovations that may improve 
project performance. 
Creating a more flexible set of rules and regulations under 
which credit projects operate is a necessary condition for 
creating long term, viable programs. It is now fairly well 
accepted that more flexibility in interest rate policy is 
essential. Subsidized rates obviously provide benefits to 
borrowers, but the cost may be high in terms of the way they 
undermine the financial institutions. A wide range of other 
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policy changes and innovations may also be usefully undertaken. 
A key issue must be addressed by all policymakers, donors 
and NGOs interested in stimulating small enterprises. This 
concerns the economic environment faced by entrepreneurs and the 
extent to which this environment must be altered before they will 
become attractive clients to financial institutions. Subsidized 
credit cannot compensate for high input prices, low product 
prices, unstable input supplies, poor information and transporta-
tion systems, and complicated rules and regulations that favor 
large enterprises. Tinkering with credit policies and programs 
will not make unprofitable enterprises profitable. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Examples include Adams et al., Ashe, Chew, Farbman, and 
Lieberson. 
2. An explanation of this process is presented by Kane in "The 
Political Economy of Subsidizing Agricultural Credit in 
Developing Countries 11 in Adams et al. 
3. See the two volumes by Hossain, and Nurazzaman. 
4. Some of the essential features of the Grameen Bank, such as 
group lending, compulsory savings, and the use of high 
interest rates, can also be found in some micro enterprise 
financing projects in other countries. For example, group 
lending is practiced in India, the Dominican Republic and 
Kenya. The insistence of savings is found in the PRODEME 
project in the Dominican Republic and the BKK project in 
Indonesia. BKK also uses a market-oriented interest rate. 
5. The initial program is described in Yunus. 
6. The exchange rate has been approximately 25 to 30 taka = $1.00. 
7. See further discussions by Kilby and D'Zmura, and Ashe on 
this point. 
8. Discussed by Farbman. 
9. Discussed by Ashe. 
10. A more complete discussion of the importance of deposit 
mobilization is found in Meyer. 
11. A test of factors affecting bank deposits in South Asia is 
found in Srinivasan and Meyer. 
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